Wittgenstein
- In this lecture, Ludwig Wittgenstein distinguishes between judgments of relative value and judgments of absolute value or ethical judgments. Briefly present this distinction in your own words.
According to Wittgenstein, relative value judgements are statements of fact, which can be translated from ‘good’ into being ‘functionally adequate;’ the ‘right road to X’ is ‘the road to take to get to X the fastest.’
Statements of absolute value, meanwhile, appear to be similes - when one says “they are a good person” they are using “good” in a similar, but not identical sense to “he is a good football player”. Such statements, however, Wittgenstein sees as ultimately boiling down to nonsense, as no factual base lies beyond such a statement.
Wittgenstein further explains judgements of absolute value by reference to miracles: miracles, he says, are still factual occurrences, but they are miraculous by virtue of the perspective we do or don’t take regarding them; magnetism, human anatomy, weather, and whatever else may have been a miracle before it was explained by science - and may still remain a miracle should that science be, for a moment, taken out of mind when one perceives it. Likewise, statements of absolute value ultimately boil down to non-sense - there is nothing ‘miraculous’ or absolute truly standing behind them.
- Wittgenstein claims that “a characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions”. In your own words, briefly explain what he means by that.
In this lecture, Wittgenstein argues that absolute value judgements are non-sense; one could see ‘they are a good person’ as a simile, using ‘good’ in a similar but non-identical sense to ‘they are a good football player.’ This, Wittgenstein argues, is a misuse of language: if one can use a simile to describe that one is ‘a good person’, then there should be a way of laying out the facts themselves that the simile describes; according to Wittgenstein, no such facts exist that correlate to ‘goodness’ in the absolute sense.
Hence, Wittgenstein’s view that :
[…] the tendency all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. […]
Stevenson
- Stevenson distinguishes between the descriptive and dynamic uses of language. What is the difference between these two uses?
Per Stevenson, descriptive use is, as the name suggests, purely descriptive; to state that “the table is white” does not command any action on the part of the listener, except perhaps to believe (that the speaker believes) that the table is white. Thus, as Stevenson says, the descriptive use of language is to “record, clarify, and communicate beliefs.” (p. 75)
Dynamic use, on the other hand, does not serve to communicate beliefs but “to give vent to feelings (interjections), or to create moods (poetry), or to incite people to actions or attitudes (oratory).” (p. 75) As such, dynamic use generally compels some kind of response from the listener.
- Stevenson also distinguishes between ‘disagreement in belief’ and ‘disagreement in interest’. What is the difference between these two kinds of disagreement, and what is the role, according to Stevenson, that empirical reasoning plays in resolving disagreements of interest?
In Stevenson’s view, disagreement in interest is when the parties disagree about something as a matter of interest; for instance, it may be in party A’s interest to be given 100eur for naught, but it would obviously not be in party B’s interest, on account of the fact that they probably also need the money. This is a disagreement in interest no amount of empirical reasoning will resolve; ultimately, the interests of A and B are simply rigidly opposed.
Disagreement in belief, on the other hand, is most easily applied to scientific theories: the various interpretations of quantum mechanics all compete for the belief of physicists, not because, say, the Big Copenhagen/Many-Worlds/Causal interpretation lobbying group is trying to find more people to pay them science dues (whatever that may be), but because there is reasoned disagreement as to which of the theories is most plausible.
According to Stevenson, some disagreements in interest can be resolved by recourse to empirical reasoning, which would resolve underlying disagreements in belief; to draw the example from the text, if two people disagree about going to the symphony, as opposed to the cinema, they will give reasons for each choice - “X conductor is visiting”, “Y movie is playing” - thus drawing them to a resolution between their disagreements in beliefs, but it is difficult to imagine that someone who simply dislikes symphony picking it over cinema merely because some conductor is visiting. Thus, while solving disagreements in beliefs through empirical reasoning can resolve disagreements of interest, that does not necessarily occur in every case.