- According to Strawson, what are the two ways in which Russell thinks that sentences that seem to be about someone or something can be significant? What does Strawson disagree with in Russell’s account? (250 words)
The two ways a sentence can be significant for Russell, per Strawson, is for it to either be an (1) (implicitly) existential statement, or for it to (2) (properly) refer to whatever it designates (p. 5).
In Strawson’s explanation, (1), in effect, serves as a solution to the problem of non-referring subjects, wherein Russell rewrites them to contain an implicit existential premise, thus rendering the whole sentence false when they are uttered (p. 6). (2), meanwhile, simply takes the meaning of the sentence to be the subject that it refers to. In either case, a sentence is only significant if it is about something.
Strawson says, instead, that Russell makes the mistake of confusing sentences (or expressions) with their use in a particular context. Strawson instead believes, as he states on pages 12-13: “[that a sentence or expression is] significant just is the fact that the sentence could be used […] to say something true or false, that the expression could be used […] to mention a particular person.”
Strawson’s fundamental disagreement with Russell lies in his view that the significance of a sentence has nothing to do with whether or not it refers to a something on a particular occasion. (p. 10) Such an approach has the advantage of avoiding Russell’s need to add the (entailed) assertion that the subject exists - an entailment Strawson does not see as justified (p. 12). Additionally, it helps avoid “the troublesome mythology of the logically proper name” (p. 10).
- Why does Strawson think that someone who was seriously to utter the sentence “The king of France is wise” today would not be making an assertion that is either true or false? How does he support this claim? (250 words)
The simplest way to explain is to draw on an example prof. Heysse made in an earlier seminar (though with a modified subject matter): when one is faced with the sentence “You should stop embezzling company funds,” one can hardly agree or disagree without implicitly confirming the ‘implied’ fact of their financial fraud. If one is to deny that they, in the first place, are stealing company money, they would not necessarily be contradicting the quoted sentence above - rather, they would be saying that the question as to whether or not they should stop does not arise, for they are not doing it in the first place.
Likewise, the sentence “The king of France is wise,” per Strawson, is significant, but it is not true or false; there are cases (say, before the Revolution of 1848), where using it would refer and be true or false. Today’s use of that sentence would not possess a truth-value, as the subject of the sentence simply fails to refer, meaning that the question of its truth or falsity simply does not arise (p. 12).