Medieval Seminar
How can we conceive the human soul as a substantial form, that is not only essentially related to the human body as a whole but also to each part of the body?
We have 3 different approaches.
First we have the quantiative whole. Then the formal/essential whole, and thirdly the power-whole. In the second paragraph aquinas discusses the possibility of discussing it as quantiatively present in each part of the body.
- as quantitative whole
Quantitative wholes must be somehow extended in space to specific parts. So basically like a line. Suppose the soul is related to the body in the same way as a line, does loosing a hand mean we lost 10% of our soul. This is not the case for Aquinas.
- or a form that is quantitatively divided through their subject.
Maybe not divisible per say, but related accidentally to the whole. We can say that there is a possibility that a form is homogenously related to a whole and its parts. It is present in every part and in the whole without differentiation, or intrinsic differences. This is the case for us because the property of whiteness is equally disposed to the whole surface to which it accidents. So if this surface is divided, the whole is still regarded as white. The whiteness is not present differently, on average, in one area and another. It is similarly present in the whole surface. Or maybe like the sweetness of wine. We can pour it into different glasses, but the sweetness remains the same. The property of sweetness is uniformly present throughout the whole body of the wine.
Maybe this division belongs primarily to the surface, and to the whiteness only accidentally. We don’t divide whiteness or sweetness, we pour the wine into different glasses. The sweetness is thus accidentally measured and quantified.
- or cannot be quantitatively divided even when the subject is divided. It is an abrigate of different powers; like sensation, growth, locomotion, etc. If we say the soul is a homogenously related whole in power, related to each part, it follows that this soul endows each part of the body with all its capacity. In the same way that we actualise the whole body. For example we have 14th century scholastic Buridan who refers to how we divide worms into different pieces. There is a kind of worm that we can divide into two pieces which do not die when they are seperated. Buridan thinks that this is becaues the soul as a power is present in each bodily part. Instead we have more living worms.
This is not the case for Aquinas.
The soul is not homogenously related to each part of the body with respect to all its powers. Instead the soul is only related to the eye only in respect to our vision. It is only related to the ear in relation to actualising our power of hearing. So the soul does not endow our body with all its powers. Rather each structure is endowed with its own kind of power.
Aquinas wants to say that a form that requires diversity in its parts like a human soul is not equally dispersed throughout its whole and its parts. So a form like the soul is heteregenously present in the whole subject. So it is not related to the whole and its parts in the same way. Instead each part has its own structures and features so that it can fulfill its own operations and functions, and this can only be accounted for by the idea of the weakness of associated perfection.
Just like one does not speak of an animal or a human being once the soul has left, so too for the hand, flesh and bones. So basically a term is used equivocally when it is applied to different things that do not share the same nature or definition. The word is the same, but the underlying reality is not. For example an artificial eye is called an eye but it is not an eye because it cannot see, and was not made for seeing. This is the case for our different bodily parts. When the soul leaves, it is not just the body that die in an equivocal way, but the hand, the toes etc. Each part is no longer truly what it once was, because it no longer possesses the essence of what defined it to be what it was. No part of the body has its proper function once the soul has left. Anything that retains its species also retains the operations belonging to its species. The soul actualises the organs that are in potency to their proper operation. The soul present in the eye enables the eye to have the potency to actually see something. So a bodily part retains its proper species only by being potentialised by the soul to have its proper function.
The soul is the first actuality of each part of the body. The soul must be in the whole body and in each part of its parts. This means that the soul is functioned as not only the first actuality of the whole body but also as the first actuality of each part.
Three different kinds of souls.
At the bottom we share the vegetative soul. It accounts for our basic life functions like nutrition, growth and reproduction.
On top of that we have the animal soul, which adds sensation, locomotion and so on. And this is common only to animals. But most animals are irrational in many ways.
And so there are rational animals. And rational animals have the intellective soul/human soul. This adds the will and the intellect as powers. With the intellect we are able to understand logic, understand each other, and we can have more rational desires, and taking accountability.
The question for Aquinas: why is a human able to carry out such a wide variety of operaitons? Does this imply that there are really different substantial forms to account for different kinds of activities, or are there multiple souls in one human being?
This is one of the most debated questions among medieval scholars. For Aquinas there is only one soul in the human being. The intellective soul.
However, Aquinas’ doctrine of the unity of the soul was a pretty alien concept at the middle of the 13th century. Because this kind of unity of form doctrine was very controversial. No earlier medieval scholastic had ever defended this doctrine, and many later scholastics would take issue with this. This is not really true. Many forerunner have defended the unity of the human soul, but they are not the dominant force at the university during that time. Especially the fransciskans take issue with Aquinas’ doctrine.
Kilwardby denounced Aquinas’ doctrines on the soul. He was the archbishop of canterbury. And he was also a principle at Merton college in Oxford. He is possibly one of the founders of Oxford.
Initially there was a condemnation by the Parisian bishop against Aquinas. He condemned 319 theological and philosophical theses as heretical. Anyone who proposes these theses will be made a heretic and excomunicated. Kilwardby issues a prohibition on 30 theses. They are only prohibited from being taugt at the university of Oxford. But anyone who proposes them will not be excommunicated. So some scholars argue that condemnation sounds really serious, but it is more like prohibition. He doesn’t like the thesis of the unity of the soul. Kilwardby condemnation is a campaign against the growing influence amongst Aquinas’ thought at the dominican order.
How can we maintain the identity of Jesus’ body when he died? If there is no additional substantial form of the body that belongs only to jesus, then how can we account for the identity of Jesus’ body during the days his soul was apart from the body. Once the soul leaves the body, the body is called a body only in an equivocal way. For Kilwardby they want to posit that there are different substantial forms. Once we are dead, we can point to a body and say whose body it is.
Shortly after Aquinas’ death, some of his propositions were condemned by the church. After three decades he became a saint. However, his doctrines were never condemned in the dominican order, they rather argued it was the only authoritative teaching of the dominican order. Kilwardby himself was however a dominican, but did not like Aquinas. One of Kilwardby’s students, wrote a long treatise defending Aquinas’ doctrine of the unity of the soul. He was excommunicated by Bishop John Peckham.
Kilwardby does not want to argue that the different levels of souls are the same soul. Aquinas thinks this.
A special delegation was sent to Oxford to investigate why Kilwardby hated unity of the soul. After this he resigns, and Peckham takes over.
In 1284, Peckham renews the condemnation of his predecessor. In this time the prohibition was upgraded into a proper condemnation. Godfrey of Fonteine complains that what Peckham did is totally irrational, he is arguing against some of the most brilliant people of the age according to him. This kind of argumentation continues for decades. This is between the dominicans and fransciscans.
Thomists: Knapwell, Sutton.
Franciscans: Bonaventure, William of Ockham, William De la Mare.
Aquinas and Plato
Aquinas attributes the view of multiple souls to Plato. What we have is a reconstructive reading from Aquinas. Plato asserts that there are diverse souls in the body, and this conclusion follows from his principles. The soul is united to the body as a mover, and not as a form. The soul is in its body as a sailor is in a ship. For Aquinas, Plato things there are diverse souls, and each soul is related to a body. And if there are diverse souls in the body, like there are different sailors with different tasks and rankings in a ship, then one must posit diverse movers where there is evidence of actions that are generically diverse. And there is a kind of hierarchy between the sailors based on the responsibility of each. In this way the rower is subordinate to the captain.