Philanthro
Heidegger focuses here on Logos apophantikos – predicative judgement.
Pseudosthai = to be false. A pseudo-philosopher is not a true philosopher.
Alethein = true.
Heidegger bases his philosophy on understanding their morpholoy and composition. Lethes was the river in Greek mythology that the dead must cross. The ones who bathed in the river would lose their memories – lethes means oblivion. The forgetfullness of being.
A-lethes: unforgetfulness. The remembrance.
Heidegger translates A-letheia as revealing, disclosing. One of the words he uses is Entbergen. Entdecken. He is playing with the etymological compositions. There is a basic forgetfulness which is unforgotten, or disclosed, in truth.
Diairesis = to split, to distinguish. The opposite of synthesis.
The logos, the predicative judgement, brings together and distinguishes – does synthesis and diairesis.
Being means the criterion of determination, the criterion by which we distinguish this from that, and identify this as this. Being is synthesis and diairesis.
Any act of identification is also an act of differentiation.
World formation is at the basis of the logos.
All truth and falsity is grounded on a previous being revealed in the world.
Apophansis means an assertion. Apophantikos means judgement. In its composition it has the word phanos, which is light. Phainomenon also has light, phanos, as its stem. The manner of what shows itself, what comes to manifestness was important, and heidegger is trying to reinvigorate this manner of thinking for modern philosophy. This latches onto some of the tropes of phenomenology as a discourse of trying to manifest what is already there implicitly to consciousness. Heidegger reads aristotle as a proto-phenomenologist. It has the connotation of brining something to light. You illuminate socrates insofar as he is mortal.
The logos insofar as the apophantikos is the ability for a comportment that points being out, that either conceals or reveals them. This is grounded in freedom.
On the essence of truth by Heidegger focuses on freedom as being the essence of truth, though he has a very counterintuitive understanding of freedom.
Richard Rorty in a way also holds the same thesis. What Heidegger here is saying is that there is an understanding of freedom which is not just whimisicality or caprice. But rather the responding to a call. To be free is to be free for. To be free to comport yourself in such a way that you corresonate or are consonsant with that you are responding to.
Spinoza has this notion of freedom: to be free is to know the causes that determinate you. It is not to be undetermined, but to know what has determined you. Freedom is not just a matter of doing whatever you want, but rather of realising the ways in which the world is always already determined and already defined. It is already such and such, and comporting yourself towards that in a harmonious manner.
Rorty when he talks on this says that there is nothing that really binds us except the discourse with other people. And our freedom is acting in harmony with that discourse. For neopragmatism the weight of the tradition is truth, and for Heidegger it is accepting that wight and carrying it over. Freedom is an attending to what came before which binds you. Falsity necessitates a prior being-free-for. He is not talking here about distinguishing scientific truth-functional statements, but he is rather talking about what is grounding of more epiphenomenal truths.
Pre-understanding – interpretation – discourse
The logos is not the ground of manifestness, but manifestness is the ground of logos. Because pre-understanding comes way before the discourse. When Heidegger speaks of logos he is speaking of the judgmental-level of language, but not language in general. He doesn’t think it can be the elementary particle.
Lee Braver – Groundless ground.
Heidegger’s notion of freedom is being bound to the manifestness of things.
The contingent ends up being the absolute in Heidegger. And this because of a pure phenomenological love of reality and the manifestness of beings.
Heidegger and Marx are two sides of the coin. Marx provides the account of an ideology, whilst Heidegger provides the account of a phenomenal reality to which the ideology pertains. Marx schematises freedom as political economists do. So he does not schematise it very much as Heidegger does. Heidegger is doing it in a more existential sense.