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Introduction

  1. Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception.
  2. The author believes that the premise is false, even if it’s possible to argue for it
  3. For the sake of argument, however, let’s grant this point.
  4. How do we get from the fetus’s personhood to the impermissibility of abortion.
  5. Thomson believes this to be a non sequitur, and hopes that after hearing her argument we will also be inclined to reject it.

Meat and potatoes

How do we get there?

  1. Fetuses are people.
  2. Every person has a right to life.
  3. The fetus has a right to life. (from 1, 2)
  4. The mother has a right to decide what happens to her body (premise)
  5. A person’s right to life is stronger than another’s right to bodily autonomy (premise)
  6. The fetus will die if they are aborted
  7. The fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed. (from 3, 4, 5)

The Violinist

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. […] He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has […] found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you-we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation?

  1. Violinists are persons (surprisingly and unfortunately)
  2. Every person has a right to life
  3. The violinist has a right to life (from 1, 2)
  4. The kidnapped has a right bodily autonomy
  5. A person’s right to life is stronger than another’s right to bodily autonomy.
  6. The violinist will die if disconnected from the kidnapped
  7. The violinist may not be killed via disconnection from the kidnapped.

The extreme view

The extreme view is the view that that abortion is impermissible even to save the mother’s life.

  1. performing the abortion would be directly killing the child
  2. doing nothing would not be killing the mother, but only letting her die.
  3. in killing the child, one would be killing an innocent person, for the child has committed no crime, and is not aiming at their mother’s death

(1)
5. killing an innocent person is always and absolutely impermissible
6. An abortion may not be performed

(2)
4. directly killing an innocent person is murder
5. murder is always and absolutely impermissible
6. an abortion may not be performed.

(3)
4. one’s duty to refrain from directly killing an innocent person outweighs one’s duty to keep a person from dying
5. an abortion may not be performed

(4)
4. if one’s only options are, directly killing an innocent person or letting a person die one must prefer letting the person die
5. an abortion may not be performed

The growing child

Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. I mean a very tiny house, and a rapidly growing child-you are already up against the wall of the house and in a few minutes you’ll be crushed to death. The child on the other hand won’t be crushed to death; if nothing is done to stop him from growing he’ll be hurt, but in the end he’ll simply burst open the house and walk out a free man.

However innocent the child may be, it cannot be argued that you must sit idly by as the child crushes you to death. A third party may argue that they cannot choose betwixt the two of you, that cannot be the case for the parties concerned.

Many feel that the pregnant woman has the status of the house, and houses aren’t generally attributed the right to self-defense.

It’s important to remember, however, that the woman is also a person, a person that houses the child.

In this argument, only two people are involved - one who threatens the other, and one who is threatened. In our case there are only two people involved, one whose life is threatened, and one who threatens it. Both are innocent: the one who is threatened is not threatened because of any fault, the one who threatens does not threaten because of any fault. For this reason we may feel that we bystanders cannot intervene. But the person threatened can.

Thus, the views 1-4 are false, and the extreme view as a whole is disproven.

A weakened extreme view

while abortion is permissible to save the mother’s life, it may not be performed by a third party, but only by the mother herself.

It is important to remember that the mother and the child do not have equal rights to the mother’s body. The mother is the owner, and therefore has much more of a right to it.

The coat analogy

If Jones has found and fastened on a certain coat, which he needs to keep him from freezing, but which Smith also needs to keep him from freezing, then it is not impartiality that says “I cannot choose between you” when Smith owns the coat.
Smith, is hardly likely to bless us if we say to him, “Of course it’s your coat, anybody would grant that it is. But no one may choose between you and Jones who is to have it.”

Is this argument a consequence of a failure to appreciate the value of ownership over something, or is it one arguing that anybody has a right to refuse to lay hands on people, even when “justice” should compel them to.

Be it the latter, one must then pay attention to the difference between “no one may choose,” “I cannot choose,” and “I will not act,”, as those are categorically different statements, with the latter “leaving it open that somebody else can or should”.

This is important to the wider argument - Thomson isn’t arguing that anyone asked to perform an abortion should do so, just that they may.

The moderate view

If the mother’s life is not at stake, surely, the fetus’s right to life must take precedence over anything else the mother may put forward.

However, Thomson argues that the right to life and the right to be given everything necessary for life is not the same.

Should Henry Fonda’s touch be the only thing that can save her from death, is it morally obligatory for him to travel all the way from the West Coast to save her with it?

The fact that the violinist needs the use of your kidneys to continue living doesn’t mean that he has a right to them - just as Ms. Thomson is not entitled to Henry Fonda’s cool touch. In both cases, Mr. Fonda or the kidnapped individual would be doing a great service to the afflicted individuals in helping them, they are not, however, in any way obligated to do so.

The right to life

What does the right to life constitute?

Some people believe that the right to life is the right not to be killed by anybody. To not have their throat slit or be shot, or, most importantly in our case, not to be unplugged from the kidnapped.

Thus, you shouldn’t unplug yourself from the violinist, as you would be directly killing him, thus violating his right to life.

1. Rights and Justice

Thomson introduces the concept that depriving someone of their rights constitutes an injustice. She uses the example of two brothers sharing chocolates:

  • Key Argument: If both brothers have a joint right to the chocolates, the older boy taking all of them would be unjust. However, if only one brother owns the chocolates, refusing to share may be mean or indecent, but not unjust.
  • Thomson distinguishes between moral obligations (e.g., generosity) and justice, which depends on rights. This sets up a framework to analyze whether abortion constitutes an unjust killing.

2. Unplugging the Violinist

  • Key Argument: Unplugging oneself from the violinist, even though it results in their death, is not unjust because the violinist has no inherent right to use your kidneys.
  • Explanation: This analogy helps Thomson argue that killing does not always violate a right to life. The act of unplugging is contrasted with killing unjustly, emphasizing the distinction between rights and moral decency.

3. Redefining the Right to Life

  • Key Argument: The right to life does not entail a right not to be killed under any circumstances; rather, it is a right not to be killed unjustly.
  • Explanation: This refinement creates room for morally justifiable killings, such as abortion, under certain conditions. It shifts the debate from whether the fetus is a person to whether abortion is an unjust killing.

Thomson examines whether partial responsibility for the fetus’s presence grants it a right to the mother’s body:

  • Key Argument: If a woman becomes pregnant through consensual intercourse, some might argue she has conferred a right to the fetus because of her role in its existence. This would make abortion akin to the unjust act of taking away chocolates.
  • Counterpoint: Thomson introduces analogies to challenge this idea. For example:
    • Burglar Analogy: Opening a window does not give a burglar the right to enter your house, even if you knew burglars existed and that opening a window makes it easier for one to get in.
    • People-Seeds Analogy: If a seed takes root in your house despite precautions, it does not have any right to stay.
  • Explanation: These analogies emphasize that taking precautions (e.g., using contraception) undermines the argument that responsibility alone grants rights.

5. Moral Decency vs. Rights

  • Key Argument: Even if a person has no right to another’s body, it might still be morally indecent to refuse help in certain situations. For example:
    • Letting the violinist use your kidneys for an hour (without harm to you) would be indecent to refuse, though not unjust.
    • A woman refusing to carry a pregnancy for a short time (if it posed no harm) might similarly be deemed indecent, but not unjust.
  • Explanation: This distinction underscores that moral obligations do not always equate to rights. It complicates arguments that label all abortions as unjust.

6. Proportionality and Sacrifice

Thomson argues that the extent of the sacrifice required affects moral obligations:

  • Key Argument: Nobody is morally required to make significant sacrifices (e.g., health, life plans, or long-term commitments) to sustain another person’s life.
  • Explanation: This argument supports the permissibility of abortion in cases where pregnancy demands significant sacrifices from the mother, highlighting the asymmetry between temporary aid (like saving the violinist for an hour) and the long-term burden of pregnancy (9 months, 9 years, etc.).

7. Application to Abortion

Thomson applies these principles to abortion:

  • Key Argument: The fetus has a right to life, but not an unconditional right to the mother’s body. Abortion can therefore be morally permissible unless the fetus has a specific right to demand the use of the mother’s body.
  • Limitations: Thomson concedes that there may be some cases where abortion is unjust (e.g., if the mother explicitly granted the fetus such a right).
  • Explanation: This nuanced stance allows for abortion in most cases while recognizing the complexity of moral and ethical obligations.

The Good Samaritan, the Minimally Decent Samaritan

  1. Good Samaritan: Goes out of their way to help others, even at personal cost or risk.
  2. Minimally Decent Samaritan: Does the least required to assist others in need (e.g., calling for help).
  • Many opponents of abortion demand a pregnant woman act as a Good Samaritan to the fetus, even though the law typically does not require this level of sacrifice in other contexts.
  • For example, in the famous Kitty Genovese case, bystanders failed even to act as Minimally Decent Samaritans, yet they faced no legal repercussions.
  1. In most countries, individuals are not legally compelled to even minimal acts of assistance (e.g., saving someone’s life).
  2. By contrast, women are often legally compelled to sustain the life of a fetus, requiring significant sacrifices.
  3. This inconsistency highlights a form of systemic injustice.

Thomson extends her argument to consider situations where a person is compelled, by nature or circumstance, to sustain another’s life. She emphasizes that while individuals are not morally required to act as Good Samaritans, the moral calculus changes when they cannot extricate themselves from the situation and appeal to others for intervention.

In such cases, Thomson argues that third parties are morally permitted to intervene to free the person from this imposed obligation, as there is no inherent right of the dependent party to the use of their body. For instance, in the analogy of the kidnapped individual attached to a violinist, others may justifiably act to sever the connection if the person cannot do so themselves, even if this results in the violinist’s death.

Implications for Abortion

Thomson uses this reasoning to address abortion laws, contending that while individuals may choose to make significant sacrifices to sustain another’s life, it is unjust to compel them to do so, either directly or indirectly. Third parties, such as medical providers, should therefore be allowed to “extricate” a pregnant individual from their situation, as the fetus does not have a right to the use of their body.

This argument further underscores the inconsistency in societal expectations and legal standards, where women are often held to a higher threshold of sacrifice than others in comparable situations, perpetuating systemic injustice.

Addressing the responsibility of parents for children

The law makes parents responsible for the upbringing of their children. Thus, the injustice brought up earlier is surely resolved, and the abortion is now impermissible.

Surely we do not have any such “special responsibility” for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly. If a set of parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for adoption, but rather take it home with them, then they have assumed responsibility for it, they have given it rights, and they cannot now withdraw support from it at the cost of its life because they now find it difficult to go on providing for it. But if they have taken all reasonable precautions against having a child, they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the child who comes into existence have a special responsibility for it. They may wish to assume responsibility for it, or they may not wish to. And I am suggesting that if assuming responsibility for it would require large sacrifices, then they may refuse. A Good Samaritan would not refuse-or anyway, a Splendid Samaritan, if the sacrifices that had to be made were enormous. But then so would a Good Samaritan assume responsibility for that violinist; so would Henry Fonda, if he is a Good Samaritan, fly in from the West Coast and assume responsibility for me.

No blanket statements

Thomson doesn’t argue for a general ban on abortion, or a general permittance of it.

She doesn’t say abortion is always morally permissible. In the case of a teenage girl being pregnant due to rape it must OBVIOUSLY be permissible, and any law that would prevent it is insane. However, it would be indecent in the woman to request an abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she is in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad.

Not all cases of pregnancy and abortion are the same - and any arguments that treat them as such are already quite suspect.

Additionally, the woman should be guaranteed a right to her body, not to the death of her child. Id est, a woman may unplug herself from the violinist, and were he to die from that, then that is simply it. However, were he, by some miracle, to survive, the woman would not then have the right to kill him.

The same stands for a child. Be it possible for the child’s life to be preserved at no cost to the mother, it should be done, and the mother should have no say in it. As, after all, that would already be taking away the child’s right to life, not simply rescinding permission for it to use the mother’s body.

And, finally, it must be remembered that these arguments are made and argued against under the supposition that the fetus is already a person from the moment of conception. A very early abortion is surely not the killing of a person, and so is not dealt with by anything I have said here.

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