Epistemology
Gettier cases are specifically good at undermining internalist justification.
As, for externalists, this sort of case might not even have been justified from the get-go.
They have a different kind of demands for knowledge.
A belief needs to be formed through a truth-conductive process to count as knowledge, they care about the believer and the state of affairs.
So let’s use reliabilism instead:
sKp iff
p is true
sBp
S’s belief was formed through a reliable method.
Reliabilism is supposed to avoid fake barn cases.
Henry’s belief formation process is unreliable when in a fake barn country.
So for the reliabilist, Henry does not have knowledge, which conforms to our intuitions.
As such, this seems better than the causal theory of knowledge at the very least.
Jack forms the true belief that it will rain tomorrow by tossing a coin.
Jack does not have knowledge according to reliabilism.
Jill forms the true belief that it will rain tomorrow by looking at a forecast.
Jill knows that it will rain tomorrow according to the reliabilism theory.
The reliabilist seems to be able to say that a stopped clock is not truth-conducive.
However, reliability is based on luck, and which is not creditable due to the agent. The luck just comes from a different source.
Intuition: reliabilism does not amount to a satisfactory account of knowledge.
However, if we have a thermostat that has broken down and so fluctuates at random, and a person operating the heat system following whatever the thermostat shows, and a person who has a belief that follows the thermostat, a lot of luck is needed for that person to actually have knowledge, and as such, that person lacks knowledge.
Usually the relation between true beliefs and states of affairs: a belief is true because it adapts itself to the world. The belief needs to match a state of affairs in the world. If the world changes, the belief has to change accordingly. The direction of fit of beliefs.
In the thermometer-thermostat case, the person’s belief is true because the belief is tracking the world in such a way that it is true. The world adapts to the belief of the cogniser in this case.
The agent has a reliably formed true belief
The belief formation process is reliable due to external conditions
the cognitive success is due to luck, and is not creditable to the agent → the agent has no knowledge.
→ reliabilism is not immune to Gettier cases.
External feature are not any features what-so-ever, they still have to be features of the belief-forming process that makes the cognitive success of a belief credtiable to the agent.
We can then try to think about doing knowledge as a thing we can be good or bad at. We need to be gathering knowledge adroitly.
Basically this follows the metaphor of the archer (or really anyone who does anything well), and exacerbates the points that that makes.
Three evaluative dimensions:
Accuracy: Is the belief true?
Adroitness: Was the belief formed virtuously? [Formed by a reliable virtue]
Aptness: Is the belief true because it was virtuously formed? «Causal connection between accuracy and adroitness«
We want all these elements to be met in order to have our knowledge.
As such, we have virtue epistemology; ie. How beliefs are formed in a virtuous manner.
Virtue epistemology is not in the game of making a theory of knowledge purely. It takes a different approach in answering epistemological questions.
Main claims that most virtue epistemologists agree on:
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epistemology is a normative discipline.
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Intellectural agensts and communities are the primary source of epistemic value and the primary focus of epistemic evaluation.
What makes belief rational?
What is intellectually valuable?
What makes for a intellectually right person?
There are epistemological approaches that pick each as their fundamental starting point.
Evidentialism uses the first:
Beliefs that are held in virtue of supporting beliefs acting as evidence for the truth of the belief.
You need to believe for the right reasons.
Reliabilism uses the second:
Beliefs formed through generally truth-conducive methods.
Virtue epistemology uses the last:
What makes a person manifest good intellectual character? Someone who reliably manifests excellent intellectual character and cognitive faculties when performing epistemic tasks.
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Epistemology should work with how we ought to perform to have knowledge.
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Traditional questions of epistemology are answered through an analysis of an agent’s intellectual virtues.
Direction of fit: Agent’s virtues are inherent in having knowledge.
Virtue epistemologists tend to distinguish between faculty virtues and trait/character virtues.
Faculty virtues:
These are usually interpreted as cognitive faculties or powers that promote intellectual excellence. Cognitive traits are a basica toolkit that we have at our disposal as epistemic agents. eg. sensory modalities, our perceptual senses, imagination, ability for abstract reasoning. These cannot be readily changed perhaps.
A such, one points towards features that more or less tend to be innate or hard-wired.
When we think about sensory perception, there is not much you one can do about having bad sight. So what does it mean to virtuously excercise these cognitive faculties? eg. Putting yourself in conditions where you can see things more clearly. Not having cataracts.
This can be partially improved by conscious effort. Eg. in the case of memory we can improve our memory by focusing on this. For virtue-epistemologists, faculty virtues are what happens when they are exercised in a manner that is truth-conducive.
Trait Virtues:
Epistemic character traits, dispositions that promote intellectual excellence. Traits that we can tweak, and have control over. Are developed through conscious effort. Typically accompanied by reflection about how one can improve at a certain work.
These are good traits that can be changed through conscious effort.
Their manner tends toward true belief.
Virtue reliabilism (externalism):
Some epistemologists think of virtue epistemology as a kind of reliabilist theory. This specific flavour of reliabilism focuses on the ways in which virtuously exercised cognitive faculties reliably produce true beliefs.
We think of the reliability of the agent
Reliability of the agent’s faculty-virtues and trait virtues
Knoweldge requires that the reliability is at the very least attributable to the virtuous exercise of an agent’s cognitive faculties.
In virtue reliabilism, the person looking at the earlier thermometer lacks knowledge, which follows our intuition.
However, due to not being able to know what sort of faculty is being applied in a certain context, virtue reliabilism might call chicken sexing knowledge despite it not being really the case.
Virtue responsibilism (internalism)
Trait virtues are the most important for intellecutal excellence
It is what the epistemic agent has control over – and can be said to be responsible for – which is the most important for intellectual virtue
Holds that knolwedge requires the ability to reflect on why belief formation is reliable.
Strong link between trait virtues and the ethical dimension of intellectual performance; eg. avoiding dogmatism, being impartial and so on.
Most of the time, both of the above actually agree with each other and make the same predictions.
Sosa advocates a combination of reliabilism and responsibilism
First order aptness:
Accuracy: It is true
Adroitness: They are virtuously formed
Narrow aptness: They are true becuase they are virtuously formed
Meta aptness: One is sure that one should form a belief due to one’s competence in evaluating risks of false belief
Both levels of aptness needs to be apt for it to be full knowledge, but having one or the other, it can still be knowledge.
Knowing full well: Having a fully apt belief
As such, the chicken sexer know what sex the chicken is, but does not know it full well.