Epistemology
We need to unpack what an epistemological theory is, epistemic status and supervenience in order to understand what internalism is.
An epistemological theory is any group of theoretical ideas that are combined as a foundation or ”way” for knowledge.
An epistemic status could be for example being (irr)rational
Supervenience refers to an asymmetrical dependence relation between two different sets of properties
A set of properties x supervenes on another set y just in case there can be no differences in x without differences in y.
The temperature (mean kinetic energy) of gas supervenes on the behaviour of its molecules
pain supervenes on the fiting of pain neurons
the asethetic properties of a painting supervenes on the microphysical properties of said painting.
-
Basically you have to change all the basic properties for the emergant properties to be the case.
The converse of supervenience is determination.
If x supervenes on y, then y-properties determine x-properties.
If two things are alike with resepct to y-propetrties, and x supervenes on y, then these two things are necessarily alike in their x-properties as well.
So when we say this about epistemic status:
This entails that: there cannot be changes to epistemic status without changes to internal status AND internal states determine epistemic status.
So, if two individuals are internally alike, then necessarily they are also epistemically alike.
One example of an internalist theory is cartesian epistemology:
Clear and distinct ideas are necessary and sufficient for knowledge, and whether one has clear and distinct ideas is an internal matter.
Cartesian epistemology however is not very popular because it requires infallibilism.
Very few beliefs are infallible so thereby very little seem to be knowledge.
Contemporarily, faillibilism is in vogue. The thesis that no belief can ever be rationally supported or justified in a conclusive way.
So fallibilism has the consequence of making it so that two people, who have the same mental states, can still make it so that 1 has knowledge and the other doesn’t.
Because if having knowledge strongly supervenes om internal states.
So one cannot be an internalist about knowledge and a fallibilist about knowledge.
So the debate between internalism and externalism is not about knowledge???
but rather about epistemic warrant, the third factor of knowledge.
Warrant is whatever distinguishes true beliefs that are knowledge from true beliefs that are not → so basically in the end it is actually just about whether the theory thinks justification is important or not.
An epistemological theory is internalist iff it implies that whether or not one is warranted wholly depends on internal states of the agent.
And so justification.
So gettier cases actually undermine internalism about warrant.
Feldman then refers to doxastic justification as well-foundedness.
It is implausible to suppose that well-foundedness supervens on purely internal states because:
-
some beliefs are based on non-accessible mental factors
-
some beliefs are based on external factors
Is it about propositional justification then? Because apparently it is not any of the above.
Yes. That’s what we’ve been talking about the entire time.
So what is externalism then?
Using justification differently:
justification is not an internal matter.
Justification does not imply veracity, ie. The quality of the justifications being true. So basically it is about causal links instead.
One could also deny justification as necessary.
This view on the debate fit s well with history.
Internalists agree that knowledge, warrant and so on may have criteria external to the agent.
We want to focus on internalism about epistemic rationality.
What the fuck is rationality then??
eg. if someone acts or believes in accordance with the truth.
However this is not really correct:
one judge may judge the evidence harshly yet form a false belief about a someone being guilty
and another could toss a coin and form the true belief that someone is guilty, calling that one irrational and the earlier rational.
So we do not consider people rational based on reasoning alone.
Rationality is usually contrasted with passions.
Acting or believing in virtue of considering the right reasons is deemed rational
Rationality then is often linked to teleology, to goal directedness.
This is important to think about in regards to different types of rationality.
We want to focus on true-belief rationality, ie. Epistemic rationality, more or less opposed to any practical rationality.
Epistemologists disagree on whether epistemic rationality, in the end, is actually a kind of instrumental rationality.
Rational beliefs are beliefs that you have good reasons for thinking are true; justified maybe????
Sometimes there is overlap between practical and epistemic rationality.
There are beliefs that help fulfill certain goals despite being false; gaslight yourself into winning.
Aquinas’ cosmological argument:
Everything we see around us has come into existence
In order to come into existence, a cause is needed
There exists a first, uncaused cause
This is God.
Pascal’s Wager
If we believe that God exists and you’re right, you’ll be rewarded with eternal life in heaven
If you believe that God exists and you’re wrong, that’s not so bad
if you believe that God does not exist and you’re right, that’s okay
If you believe that God does not exist and you’re wrong, you’ll be punished with an eternal life in hell.
→ it’s best to believe in God.
Pascal was trying to say that belief is not irrational.
And did this through a practically rational argument rather than an epistemoligically rational one.
Why should we care about rationality?
A belief is justified iff it is rational; they are two sides of the same coin.
If sKp then sbR
Thus, one interpretation is that we should maximise true beliefs.
But one could satisfy this by eg. learning every digit of pi, which is infinite, and so one would have an infinite amount of true beliefs, but which are useless and so epistemically irrational (unless it is pi day in the US) though this irrationality is not epistemic, it is practically irrational.
OR
one should rather minimise false beliefs.
Homer does not believe a single proposition → as such has the minimal amount of false beliefs.
This behaviour however is epistemically irrational.
There seems to be more to life than just gaining or minimising true beliefs.
Important truths: lead to other truths (right…)
unimporant truths: eg. truth about every digit of pi.
There seem to be a difference between voluntary and involuntary beliefs.
And so forth one is not responsible for those that are involuntary whilst one is responsible for voluntary beliefs.
There is a difference between an epistemic normativity
Deontic epistemic rationality
the agent forms their beliefs by following certain norms
those norms are right according to the agent
(Ought implies can)
Weak demand for rationality
non-deontic breaks the link for rationality and responsibility.
The deontic then is quite similar to the internalist conception.
Internalism might make it so that an agent with limited intellectual capabilites have no knowledge at all, because they are not actually grasping all those things that get them the responsibility needed for knowledge.