History
The second world war as a frame of referens for organising European security today; the attack on ukraine and populist politics; the attack on Ukraine and the order of 1989. The background of Vladimir Putin. One of his key experiences in his biography is what happened in november 89 when he was working as KGB agent in Dresden. The perspective of a KGB officer of the breakdown of a world to which one devoted their entire life to might have been devestating or at least somehow deep for Putin.
References to Munich 38, Potsdam and so forth.
The speech by JD Vance at Munich two weeks ago, that the threat for Europe actually comes from the inside.
Today’s current issue is Ukraine. The invasion of Ukraine as a caesura.
Life during wartime, talking heads: not referring to Ukraine, or the cold war, but rather to a situation in which it is not clear whether there is a war or not. Where the language of war takes over but there are no bombs. There is violence and insecurity, panic all around with terrorism and threats. It is interesting to reflect on what security scholars say in this regard: we neither have a peace nor a war situation in Europe. The war itself is not only happening in the Ukraine, and the ”war”-like state in Europe is both connected and not connected to the war in Ukraine.
Everything that happens in a globalised world affects the rest of that globalised world.
Does it make sense to speak of a post-war period?
Full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We see a big change in history here where we see what is a new caesura. If we think about the fact that this conflict is represented as a rise of the multi-polar world order, we can have a good entrypoint.
Genocidal war: the word has legal and historical implications. It was brought up after WWII initially. What is often quoted in this case is the deportation of children. The problem with a genocide is that one needs to know the intention of doing different kinds of population forcing. The forced movement of children here seems to effectively be good evidence for genocide, together with other attacks such as against the civillian population.
We want to answer the question about whether this can be explained fully through the changes within Russia, or was it more that Russia was treated indiscriminately to be forced to act as they did.
When is someone actually convicted for war crimes or genocide? «war crimes are not necessarily the same as genocide»
It’s important to understand that these questions are not necessarily what it means for the victims, but how to frame this in legal terms.
How can we scientifically describe what is happening in Russia? To what extent is it totallitarian or fascist?
It seems at least that it is not a fully totallitarian society, but is it on the same level as Stalin’s soviet union? Probably not. But it seems to be undergoing a process of de-democratisation. This is a process which seems very rare in history prior to it happening Russia interestingly though.
It has forced many European players to think about their own position in regards to safety. Belgium is spending heavily on defence suddenly, whilst cutting away at other sectors.
Will the united states keep up its nuclear umbrella over western Europe? What can happen instead? Can the French step in? Etc… What happens in Ukraine affects everyone.
Economic reprecussions: particularly visible in regards to energy.
During a UN general assembly demanding Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine:
One year after the invasion, large parts of the globe supported the resolution. This seems to not be a north-south, east-west thing in this case.
The US is no longer siding with the countries that it since the 1917 more or less always sided with. There were perhaps some previous crises where this was not the case, but more or less the US has sided only with the rest of western Europe on most questions.
There seems to be a very deep change, questioning most of what we have previously learned in school. Israel interestingly also voted against, together with Syria.
The sanctions against Russia are questioned deeply by the populist movements across Europe like Orban and AfD.
It was agreed that there would be less attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine after a certain point in the war. However, this was never the case. There was a clear strategy of freezing Ukraine by constantly attack its energy networks. Ukraine was successful in rebuilding its energy infrastructure.
The nordstream pipeline was used in order to create dependencies on Russian energy. There are investigations about how this can have been potentially criminal. Stasi officers having been the people pushing this kind of solution.
The level of destruction in the Ukraine and the deliberate burning of grain. The WW1 style buildings having been completely bombed to the ground. Most schools now teach underground in order to still be able to teach children at the front line.
Reminiscent of the total war during WW1. There is no seperation between home-front and front-as-such.
At the beginning of the war it was unclear for many outside observers as to what degree Ukraine is really different from Russia. For a long time since the colonisation of the Ukraine in the 18th century, the borders have been blurred.
Zelensky was famous and popular both in Russia and Ukraine.
Phases of the full-scale invasion:
The Minsk I and II-settlements. Were utter failments. Tried to stabilise the front in those parts of Russia with so-called ”seperatists”. The problem with the agreements was that Russia was not regarded as part of the conflict. They were rather regarded as one of the countries able to solve the conflict. It is likely that Merkel’s desire to keep receiving cheap Russian gas also played a role in this. One could then point to the changing Russian rhetoric in the ensuing years of 2021. Putin began questioning whether Ukraine has a right to exist. He makes an ultimatum in 21 where he questions that the order of 89 needs to be entirely undone.
There were attempts after the ultimatum to enter into talks from the US administration, not with the idea to undo the 89 order, but, with the creation of the ”people’s republics” of Eastern Ukraine, these can be an example of an addition to the order of 89.
This seems like a step of appeasement that cannot be undone when it comes to be the case.
It seems that many of the earlier Russian invasion-attempts were meant to be really short and to quickly establish a new government. These plans failed. The Russian troops were quite close to Kiev, but never reached.
The Ukraine war is fought with an incredible number of drones, a kind of warfare unimaginable before. It is a war fought with Western support. Some say that this support is not actually what keeps the war machine going as such.
In Germany there are heated debates on how to treat support. All the countries of Europe had to be challenged in their assumptions about how to deal with weapon-stocks.
The drone war is a kind of military revolution, which renders a lot of common weapons in war a lot less useful. The whole rationale of the war has changed through them.
The Ukraine which more or less lacks a navy was able to use naval drones against the russian navy.
The question of mobilisation also becomes crucial. What is actually at stake here? One reason why Ukraine was successful against Russia is the early mobilisation of everyone 27 and above. Russia did not do this. They fought initially with a professional army that was mainly defeated. They then mobilised part of the population. It is interesting to see that Russia never went for full mobilisation. So it seems that even in a totalitarian system, one cannot demand everything from your population. Mobilisation is historically one of the least popular policies that any force can take up. The short life of moblised soldiers in Russia further enforces this impossibility.
Russia has been forced to enlist things like the Wagner group and the use of inmates.
The developments in Syria are a direct consequence of the failure of the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. Russian could no longer serve to fully defend the Assad government.
This really a conflict with global reprecussions.
If we talk of north and south korea, there are even similarities we can draw. We might be able to speak of this as a kind of world war.
What Putin calls the root causes of Russia’s invasion is the nazi state of Ukraine. What does Putin actually want to say with this? He does not believe that Ukraine is led by nazi politicians, normally jews are not nazis (though sometimes…). Ukraine is one of the very few European countries where the alt right never went beyond 5%. So it is a bit strange that even in the West this argument has been accepted. He is referring of course partially to the second world war. What he means to convey however, is a change of the current elected government. They need to be ousted and be given a pro-russian one instead. Denazification as such means that there are politicians which Russia does not like, and they should be substituted by puppet-state leaders or collaborative advisors at least.
It is important to see that what is seen since 2014, is a tactic of overflow of falsities. Democratic societies cannot handle too many and so end up concluding nothing.
What we see in infographic regarding who supported the Ukraine with weapons:
Some countries has seen it as a total taboo to send weapons into an armed conflict. It seems that the closer one country is to Ukraine, the higher the aid.
Many have debated the question of how this conflict came about.
The sources here need to be given a kind of veto-power.
The West failed to integrate Russia in a reasonable way, taking into account Russian mentality, history, and concerns regading security. This is later quoted by Putin himself. This interpretation puts the blame on the West. Putin warned the West and no one would listen. So Putin had no other choice than to invade Ukraine [seems dubitable].
For one, how relevant is the NATO-story? Can the NATO-story explain the deportation of children? It seems to have more to do with imperialism and other concerns.
One could look at this NATO-story and see that what happened in the last 35 years between NATO and Russia was not a positive story. It failed to have positive results. The blame can be put to misunderstanding, decisions which were made without giving due attention to certain facts.
Some will say that NATO was not just too much in the offensive, but that the problem is rather that NATO didn’t react at all after 2014. There many noteworthy developments, such as the peace charter of 1990, an attempt at establishing a post 89 peace order which takes into account the sovereignty of the new states, and also allows states to choose whatever lines they see fit. Particularly tragic in many respects is the Budapest memorandum. It was pushed for by the US. The Ukraine had the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, bigger than China at the time, and that was given up by the Ukraine in exchange that they would get guarantees from France, Russia and the US. The idea there was [Belarus has nuclear weapons] to avoid nuclear weapons being spread all over the world for smaller countries. They could be safe in the imperial powers.
NATO Russian Founding act of 97. An attempt to take into account russian sensitivities for NATO.
The first and second chechen war: led by Putin, were official for Putin’s popularity.
NATO-enlargment: the whole term of natoenlargement is a strange term, it starts with the assumption that there is a decision in Brussels or Washington to expand NATO. It is quite often that NATO slows down their own process, whilst there is an influx of other countries leadership asking to join NATO.
At the time of the NATO-enlargement, NATO started playing an active role in the active role in the wars of Yugoslavia. NATO acted in order to stop the genocide, or this was the idea at least. NATO bombed Serbian cities into submission.
And then the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Attacks during which the CIA claimed there WMD in Iraq. Which, after they invaded, found to have never existed. It was an invasion which in terms of international law was entirely problematic. Russia wasn’t consulted regarding this invasion which they felt was necessary. This created a further precedent which Russia used as a reason for random warfare: if the US can do it, so can Russia.
There is the Bucharest summit: Georgia and Ukraine as potential NATO candidates. Russian invasion of Georgia. The compromise of saying that they could only become NATO members maybe in the future, rather than now, likely makes Russia invade earlier rather than later. What you see immediately is the invasion of Gerogia, which led to the creation of two seemingly independent republic, south ossetia and abkhazia.
US-Russia reset: the US has to talk to Russia, and not the countries that are actually involved in any conflict.
2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian-led insurgency in Donbas: as a consequence of Euromaidan.
Many russian players on the ground probably helped to bring both invasions about.
After 1990: there is a referendum in all parts of Ukraine about whether they should be part of Russia or Ukraine. They all voted to remain.
The Euromaidan: strong democracy movement, pro EU-course.
The argument of the NATO encirclement of Russia seems not to hold.
Why is this discussion crucial today?
Most nations in Europe barely have military spending today. As in ”Where have all the soldiers gone?”
Russia has an interest in giving lower numbers about their military spending. It is likely Russia spends about 7% of GDP on military spending but it is very difficult to tell.
Professor thinks that Europe actually has a similar military spending in total.
Post-Heroic Gallup, 2024-study.
Most people are not really willing to fight for their country. Most people do not care about their nations very deeply like before. There seems to be an east-west shift however, but it is not all that important. Most people in Russia are not willing to mobilise to ”defend” their country. The mindset is likely not completely different there.
Interpretation opinion Article from 2022 on Putin.
The Washington establishment is a deep assumption of the article. Everything thought in the article is from an american point of view. They counter the argument that Russia wasn’t heard, and that there had been attempts to incorporate Russia.
The article ties into the misunderstanding debate. What they argue is that the West failed to understand the concerns already voiced by Putin as early as 2007. The question is what should have been done? Either to have defended those that were weak against Russia, or something else.
We do not necessarily need the term colonialism or decolonialisation; but there is a strong aspect which historical research shows here.
There was a mindset that dominated this period after 89 which this article shows well.
The cold war in 51 is not the same as in 83.
Potsdam conference
Division of Germany into four occupation zones: denazificiation, democratisation, demilitarisation, decentralisation. But ope nquestion of reperations.
Division of Europe into sphere of influence, which follow the military situation in May 45. Putin thinks there should be such spheres in Europe, to go back to the settlement after 45.
The beginning of the epoch of superpowers postwar. Europe is marginalised and is at the disposal of the superpowers.
These superpowers are not purely superpowers of the 19th century, but both also have different ideologies.
Confrontation with USSR for USA not yet conceivable (military asymmetry in Europe). But: US Nuclear deterence.
No peace treaty for Germany until today. Austria gets on in 1955 and becomes neutral.
Statis Eastern Europe still partially open: Czechoslovakia. By 1948 grip on the whole reguon by USSR
War alliance USA-USSR under pressure. Old and new fritctions
→ elections in eastern europe.
→ problem of exact reach of territorial influence (Greece)
→ Problem of Poland Government in exile, Katyn.
Many proxy wars during the cold war.
The wars having local roots, but are really supported and fought between greater actors. For the countries, the term ”cold” war fails to make sense of course.
It is a conflict between different systems. The systems employed were not always too different though, and there were certain challenges which both saw in this feat. The exchange between gases into germany was already completed in the 70s.
The wars are usually about which one is economically more potent. There is a constant war in the background of much media about which system delivers more at the time. It is a conflict which is about knowledge of the other side. The knowledge of the other side is often exaggerated, but simultaneously underestimated. It is difficult to know the performance and intentions of the other side, and the strange thing about 89 is that no western scholars saw it coming. There is lots of misunderstandings ongoing.
Russians: it has a strange theme, is sung weirdly, but was widely perceived as a great representation of the ”how do we think of the other side?”. There are many cultural expressions of this, for example Rambo movies, rocky 1-5. Many of these famous cultural production reflect this conflict in a similar way to Sting.
The interpretation of what the cold war was changed constantly in time. Intially in the 50s and 60s, scholars argued that the cold war is basically a free world idea. The free world is threatened by dictatorial communism, and if one doesn’t defend oneself, also in Korea and Vietnam, then the communists would take over the whole world. The cold war is about a west that defends its own values.
The revisionist school: Argue that it is not so much about soviet aggression, but also about the US not willing to meet the Soviet’s need for security. USSR lost enormous amounts of its population, and it wants safety after this, but the West fails to accept this. The open door policy of the USA becomes problematic in its aggressive approach.
Post-reivisionist school: both West and East are responsible. It is about mutual misunderstanding, both sides are projecting into the mind of the other side, which unleashes a certain logic which creates a cold war framework that cannot be overcome, as both assumes that one step in the wrong direction gives advantage to the opposite side.
And a heavier focus on global north and south.
The history of current events themselves are not so complicated if we understand how the structures of the cold war came about.
After 1918, the US leaves Europe. They don’t engage in the league of nations. After 45, this changes. The US stays with the Marshal plan, and financially supports all of Europe. If we listen to trump, the EU was set up to extract money from the US. The US stays in Europe actually not because Europeans want this, but because the US is insterested in defending the European market for itself, and keeping the atlantic ocean safe for trade.
It is an agreement that makes sense for both sides however, ”to keep the russians out, the americans in and the germans down” at the creation of NATO.
Russia emerges as the new threat already here. To keep Russia out, the US has to be there instead. For the Europeans, it is also handy because the Europeans can say that the high command is always in the hands of the Americans. This is the rationale behind what is happening after 45. In European historical terms, this is revolutionary of course. On the flipside, there is no European army. It seems to be impossible for there to be a European army actually. Inter-european rivalries remain in this regard.
The warsaw pact is on the surface the same thing as NATO but for the east. The warsaw pact is however much stricter, and is also a means of control, perhaps more-so than NATO.
The big problem for the West since 45 is that the numbers of the Eastern army was much higher than the NATO armies. The Soviet union had an immense army, that Russia still uses today. If there would have been a conventional war, chances is that the West would have lost. In terms of numbers, at least. As such, nuclear weapons become so important it is almost perverse, as every politican immediately sees that they must retaliate with nukes. As such there are crazy war-games calculaton at hand about which cities are really worth nuking.
Much of the postwar period was about showing off, and flagstaffing. The wall becomes a very big symbol for the cold war, but it also tells us something about this cold war. The wall is built becomes many east germans leave for the west, mainly the young. It is clear by the late 50s that east germany would collapse if that continues. The west knows this will cause immense instability, to they allow the USSR to build the wall, which stabilises the wall.
Kennedy claiming ”Ich bin ein Berliner” being a big symbol as well.
Kennedy 63: ”Freedom has many difficulties and democacy is not perfect, but we have never had to put a wall up to keep our people in, to prevent them from leaving us.”.
How did the cold war look in Germany in a military way:
40000 Belgian troops stationed in West Germany for example. It is almost twice as much as the entire Belgian army today.
A change from Army of occupation to an Army of protection. Elvis Presley served in West Germany.
There is also an effect in regards to civil protection. Bunkers become quite common. Now however, bunkers are reconsidered once again as useful for protection. Revolutionary change in German spending going to bunkers and civil protection now.
These are societies which live with war, which expect nuclear wars. Weird ideas about how long a bunker can survive a nuclear winter.
Nuclear weapons in the Ardennes heavily disputed in the 80s.
The military rationale: you can shoot them from fighter jets and submarines.
1987 INF Intermediaterange nuclear forces treaty: US withdraws in 2019.
1990 treaty on vonventional armed force in Europe (CFE): Russia withdraws in 2007 and 2015 after citing breach of treaty by NATO.
2011: new START treat; russia announces suspension in 2023.
Peace movement:
The movment emerged during WW1
New challenges after WWII. Anti nuclear armament
New social basis. Less elitist
Mass appeal, highest degree of mobilisation around 60 and 80s
Emergence of ransational anti-war movement.
Peace movement in 80s.
Biggest demonstration ever in Belgium: the stationing of nuclear weapons in Belgium.
The nuclear threat was not perceived so much after 84-85.
Sheehan’s text:
War in former Yugoslavia as turning point: European civilian state tested
Post 89 situation: old or new roles for European states?
Kosovo as test case (European military policy)
Iraq as testcase (coalition of the willing, meanings of war on terror)
Joschka Fischer, 1999 special convention German Green party on Kosovo-war, paint bomb.
The argument was that there should be no more war, but there should also be no more auschwitz, and no more auschwitz is more important than no more war. As such the green party sided with war much in the same way as the left during ww1. Similar in the way that they were pacifist parties that were swayed to fully support war.
New cold war?
Do we still live in the cold war? Post-cold war? Or a new cold war?
End of history → return of history.